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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge: 
 
Defendant-appellant Dwayne Stevens (Stevens) pleaded 
guilty to an indictment charging him with one count of 
carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2119, and one count 
of carrying a firearm during the commission of a violent 
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c). Subsequently, 
Stevens pleaded guilty to an information charging another, 
separate carjacking offense. At a consolidated proceeding, 
the district court sentenced Stevens to 130 months' 
imprisonment for the indicted carjacking offense, followed 
by a minimum mandatory consecutive term of 120 months' 
imprisonment for the firearms offense, and also sentenced 
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him to 120 months' for the other carjacking offense, to be 
served concurrently with the other sentence. Stevens now 
appeals both of his sentences. We affirm. 
 
Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
Stevens committed two separate carjacking offenses on 
February 6, 1997, and February 11, 1997. Regarding the 
February 11, 1997 offense, Stevens was indicted on 
November 20, 1997 in United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania for one count of 
carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 2119, and one count 
of carrying a firearm while committing a violent crime, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c). Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, he pleaded guilty to both counts on February 2, 
1998. Regarding the February 6, 1997 offense, Stevens was 
charged by information on March 26, 1999 with another 
count of carjacking, to which he pleaded guilty (waiving 
indictment) on May 18, 1999. The two cases were 
consolidated for sentencing. 
 
The district court sentenced Stevens on August 24, 1999. 
Regarding the indictment for the February 11, 1997 
offense, the district court sentenced Stevens to a term of 
130 months' imprisonment for the carjacking count and a 
mandatory consecutive term of 120 months' imprisonment 
for the firearm count, to be followed by a three-year term of 
supervised release. Regarding the information for the 
February 6, 1997 offense, the district court sentenced 
Stevens to 120 months' imprisonment and three years of 
supervised release, to be served concurrently with his other 
sentence. The district court also ordered a $100 special 
assessment fee. Final judgment was entered on August 25, 
1999, and Stevens filed his notice of appeal for both 
sentences on September 1, 1999. The two appeals were 
consolidated on September 30, 1999. 
 
Discussion 
 
On appeal, Stevens argues that the district court erred in 
failing to "verify" whether he had read and discussed the 
presentence investigation report (PSR) with his attorney, in 
denying his request for a downward departure, and in 
calculating his sentence. Finding no merit to his 
arguments, we now affirm. 
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I. Rule 32's "Verification" Requirement 
 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A) requires that before imposing 
sentence, a district court must "verify that the defendant 
and defendant's counsel have read and discussed the 
presentence report."1 This Court has declined to interpret 
Rule 32 as creating "an absolute requirement that the court 
personally ask the defendant if he has had the opportunity 
to read the report and discuss it with counsel." United 
States v. Mays, 789 F.2d 78, 79 (3d Cir. 1986). Instead, we 
have allowed for a more functional fulfillment of the rule, 
requiring only that the district court "somehow determine 
that the defendant has had this opportunity." Id. at 80.2 
 
In the present case, it appears that the district court fell 
short of even this mark. At sentencing, the district court 
made the following remarks: 
 
        This is the time set for sentencing in the matter of 
       United States v. Dwayne Stevens in connection with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This requirement originally appeared as FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1)(A), 
which provided that before sentencing, the court"shall (A) determine 
that the defendant and the defendant's counsel have had the opportunity 
to read and discuss the . . . report." In 1994, Rule 32 was amended and 
reorganized into its present form. Most of this Court's cases considered 
the pre-1994 language of Rule 32, but for purposes of this appeal, the 
changes are quite minor and those cases retain their relevance. 
 
2. The Mays court noted that the drafters of Rule 32 explicitly imposed 
on district courts the requirement of conducting a direct colloquy with 
the defendant elsewhere in the Rule, specifically in subsection (a)(1)(C), 
now (c)(3)(C). This subsection requires a district court, before imposing 
sentence, to "address the defendant personally and determine whether 
the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any 
information in mitigation of the sentence." The Mays court reasoned that 
the drafters could have imposed a similar requirement on a court for its 
determination about whether the defendant had read and discussed the 
PSR with his attorney, but had not. Accordingly, the court declined to 
impute such a requirement into the provision at issue here. See Mays, 
798 F.2d at 80. In reaching this conclusion, the Mays court disagreed 
with the Seventh Circuit, which had construed Rule 32 to impose an 
affirmative duty on the part of the sentencing court to address the 
defendant directly on the question of his having read and discussed the 
PSR with counsel. See United States v. Rone, 743 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th 
Cir. 1984). 
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       charges filed in this court to Docket Numbers 97-625 
       and 99-6 -- 99-165. A presentence investigation has 
       been done with respect to the charges and those 
       respective informations or indictments and that 
       presentence investigation included that the total 
       offense level here was 27 and criminal history category 
       was six, and that therefore the guideline provisions 
       were 130 to 162 months. And, there is, of course, the 
       mandatory consecutive term on Docket 97-625 of ten 
       years. Are there any requests for additions or 
       corrections to the presentence?" 
 
We have no doubt that the omission by the able trial judge 
was inadvertent and doubtless a lapse from his usual 
practice. At all events, the statement does not meet Rule 
32's mandate that the court "verify," in one way or another, 
that the defendant has read and discussed the PSR with 
his attorney. In fact, the government concedes that the 
district court failed to satisfy this requirement. Stevens 
contends that the district court's noncompliance with Rule 
32(c)(3)(A) constitutes reversible error and that this Court 
should vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. 
Because Stevens did not bring this matter to the district 
court's attention, the applicable standard of review is that 
of "plain error," as Stevens concedes. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 
52(b); United States v. Dozier, 119 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
Under the plain error standard of Rule 52(b),3 this Court 
may vacate and remand Stevens's sentence only if wefind 
that (1) an error was committed; (2) the error was plain; 
and (3) the error affected Stevens's substantial rights. See 
United States v. Olano, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777-78 (1993). In 
most cases, the language about affecting substantial rights 
"means that the error must have been prejudcial," that is, 
"[i]t must have affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings." Id. at 1778. If a forfeited error is "plain" and 
"affect[s] substantial rights," a Court of Appeals "has the 
authority to order correction, but is not required to do so." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) provides that "[p]lain errors or defects 
affecting 
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the 
attention of the court." 
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Id. The Court should exercise its discretion to order such a 
correction only if the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, 
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at 
1776. 
 
As the error was "plain," our next inquiry must be 
whether it affected Stevens's "substantial rights." No 
published opinion of this Court has yet addressed this 
question. The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits have all considered the issue, however, and have 
found, under either a "plain error" or "harmless error" 
analysis,4 that a district court's failure to comply with the 
dictates of Rule 32(c)(3)(A) (or its earlier counterpart) does 
not require vacatur and remand if the defendant cannot 
demonstrate that he suffered prejudice from the district 
court's error. See United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 89 
(4th Cir. 1995) (applying plain error analysis to hold that 
when defendant pointed to no portion of the PSR that he 
would have challenged had the district court conducted an 
express inquiry, he did not show prejudice and vacatur and 
remand were not warranted); United States v. Stevens, 851 
F.2d 140, 144 & n.7 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding no prejudice 
from district court's failure to address defendant directly 
about an allegedly inaccurate PSR because the court did 
not rely on any incorrect information in the PSR, and 
refusing to vacate and remand); United States v. Rodriguez- 
Luna, 937 F.2d 1208, 1213 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to 
vacate and remand when defendant could not show 
prejudice from district court's failure to conduct express 
inquiry about the PSR); United States v. Davila-Escovedo, 
46 F.3d 840, 844 (9th cir. 1994) (applying harmless error 
analysis, without addressing plain error, to deny 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The primary difference between the two standards of review is that 
under plain error review, the defendant rather than the government 
bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. See Olano, 113 
S.Ct. at 1778 ("In most cases, a court of appeals cannot correct the 
forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was 
prejudicial."). Moreover, under plain error review, even if the Court of 
Appeals concludes that substantial rights were affected, although it "has 
the authority to order correction" it "is not required to do so," id., and 
it 
should do so only if the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, 
integrity, 
or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at 1776. 
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defendant's request for resentencing when defendant made 
no claim of prejudice from the district court's Rule 32 
violation); United States v. Rangel-Arreola, 991 F.2d 1519, 
1526 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1993) ("While we recognize 
presentence reports are critical to sentencing and fairness 
requires the defendant be given the opportunity to read the 
report and discuss it with counsel, we will not remand for 
resentencing without some showing of prejudice by the 
defendant. To remand when no prejudice exists is to 
require the district court to undergo an exercise in futility 
in order to obtain the same sentence."). 
 
The record reflects that the PSR was sent both to Stevens 
personally and to his counsel, and that thereafter and prior 
to sentencing defense counsel filed a memorandum with 
the court discussing the PSR, and noting with respect to its 
recital of Stevens's past criminal convictions that"Mr. 
Stevens does not deny his involvement in this conduct." 
Similarly, at sentencing defense counsel discussed the 
PSR's description of Stevens's prior offenses and stated "Mr. 
Stevens does not dispute the fact that he was involved in 
that conduct or that he pled guilty to those." Neither 
Stevens's original nor his reply brief asserts that either 
Stevens or his counsel did not receive and read the PSR or 
did not discuss it together; nor does Stevens therein raise 
any claim of prejudice or assert any inaccuracy in the PSR. 
Nor does anything in the record suggest otherwise. Stevens 
merely contends that the district court's error was 
"equivalent to a structural defect" in the sentencing 
process, affected his substantial rights per se , and therefore 
requires automatic vacatur and remand. Wefind this 
contention meritless. 
 
At oral argument Stevens's counsel continued to 
predicate his Rule 32 contention on the basis of asserted 
structural defect. Nor did he assert that Stevens had not 
read the PSR or had not discussed it with counsel. He 
conceded that Stevens did not deny involvement in the 
prior criminal offenses listed in the PSR. However, under 
questioning by the court, counsel did assert that Stevens 
had not read the entire PSR and had not discussed the 
entire PSR with counsel. Counsel also asserted that the 
PSR erroneously failed to indicate that a co-perpetrator was 
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involved in one of the instant offenses, that Stevens did not 
knowingly waive counsel in one of his prior retail theft 
convictions, and that the PSR erroneously stated he had 
struck the victim in a prior conviction for robbery and 
burglary (the latter two contentions are difficult to reconcile 
with counsel's above noted statements to the district court 
at and before sentencing). Since these contentions were not 
raised on brief (nor below), they are waived. See, e.g., In Re 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 145 F.3d 124, 133 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993). In any 
event, no prejudice is shown. Stevens was sentenced at the 
very bottom of the applicable guideline range. None of the 
matters mentioned could have affected Stevens's criminal 
history category (although the retail theft conviction matter 
could have reduced his criminal history points by one) or 
the applicable guideline range, and, considering the record 
as a whole, it is clear that even if all these matters were 
resolved in Stevens's favor there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the sentence would have been different. 
 
The Supreme Court has distinguished between two types 
of constitutional error that occur at both trial and 
sentencing: "trial errors," which are subject to 
constitutional harmless error analysis, and "structural 
defects," which require automatic reversal or vacatur. See 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264-65 (1991); 
United States v. Pavelko, 992 F.2d 32, 35 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Structural defects "defy analysis by harmless error' 
standards," Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. at 1265, because they 
"infect the entire trial process," Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 
S.Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993). Without certain "basic 
protections" such as the right to counsel or an unbiased 
judge, "a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as 
a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, .. . and no 
criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally 
fair." Rose v. Clark, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106 (1986) (internal 
citations omitted); see also Chapman v. California, 87 S.Ct. 
824, 827-28 & n.8 (1967) (observing that some 
constitutional minimums are "so basic to a fair trial that 
[their] infraction can never be treated as harmless error"). 
 
"The list of errors that are structural in quality is a 
limited one," West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53, 60 n.7 (3d Cir. 
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2000), and includes complete denial of counsel, biased 
judges, racial discrimination in selection of grand jury, 
denial of self-representation at trial, denial of public trial, 
and seriously defective reasonable doubt instruction, see 
Neder v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1833 (1999) (listing 
cases). See also United States v. Mortimer, 161 F.3d 240, 
241-42 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding structural defect in judge's 
unexplained absence from the courtroom during defense 
counsel's closing argument); Henderson v. Frank , 155 F.3d 
159, 170 (3d Cir. 1998) (deprivation of right to counsel at 
suppression hearing constituted structural defect). 
Structural errors at sentencing include deprivation of 
counsel during the sentencing hearing itself, see United 
States v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 221-22 (3d Cir. 1995), 
abdication of judicial role by authorizing a probation officer 
to determine the manner of restitution, see United States v. 
Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1438-39 (7th Cir. 1995), and in 
absentia sentencing, see Hayes v. Arave, 977 F.2d 475, 
479-80 (9th Cir. 1992). "Stevens invites this Court to add to 
this "very limited class of cases," Johnson v. United States, 
117 S.Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997), noncompliance with Rule 
32(c)(3)(A)'s verification requirement. We must decline his 
invitation. First, it is indisputable that a violation of Rule 
32(c)(3)(A) is nonconstitutional error, which generally cannot 
amount to a structural defect. See United States v. 
Quintero, 38 F.3d 1317, 1331 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding 
violation of statutory right nonconstitutional error).5 
Second, we do not consider this error a structural defect 
because the district court's failure to verify whether Stevens 
had read and discussed the PSR with counsel does not 
"necessarily render [the sentencing process] unfair." Rose, 
106 S.Ct. at 3106 (emphasis added). At sentencing, Stevens 
was represented by counsel before an impartial judge; in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Nonconstitutional error is harmless when "it is highly probable that 
the error did not contribute to the judgment." United States v. Dispoz-O- 
Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Government of 
Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976)); see also 
Kotteakos v. United States, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248 (1946) (when reviewing 
nonconstitutional errors on direct appeal, conviction or sentence will 
only be set aside if "the error itself had substantial influence" on the 
outcome). Accordingly, without any showing of prejudice, 
nonconstitutional error will usually be deemed harmless. 
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the presence of both these protections, we recognize a 
"strong presumption" against finding any other errors to be 
structural defects. See id. The district court's 
noncompliance with Rule 32(c)(3)(A) did not infect"each 
and every aspect" of Stevens's sentencing, but rather only 
the determination of the extent of Stevens's familiarity with 
the PSR. Cf. Hays, 977 F.2d at 479. Stevens was still able 
to make any and all objections to the PSR, as well as the 
government's arguments, and had the opportunity to 
address the court before sentencing. The impact, if any, of 
this error--and as noted above, Stevens makes no 
competent allegation of inaccuracy in the PSR, or that he 
never read it6--was localized and did not exhibit the same 
"pervasive" effect as the structural errors that this Court 
and others courts have recognized. See id. 
 
Our conclusion finds support in two of this Court's 
recent opinions, United States v. Faulks, 201 F.3d 208 (3d 
Cir. 2000), and United States v. Beckett, 208 F.3d 140 (3d 
Cir. 2000). In Faulks, the district court violated FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 43(a) by resentencing Faulks by written judgment 
only, instead of orally and in Faulks's presence. This Court 
held that this error required automatic vacatur and 
resentencing because a defendant's right to be "eyeball[ed]" 
by the sentencing judge was "not a meaningless formality" 
but rather a "fundamental procedural guarantee that places 
the defendant before the judge at a culminating moment of 
the criminal judicial process." Faulks, 201 F.3d at 209, 
211. This protection, the Faulks court found, was "deeply 
rooted" in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment. See id. at 211. Stevens has not alleged a Rule 
43(a) violation and has not provided anything beyond his 
own unfounded assertions to demonstrate the "special 
importance" of the district court's error that would render 
it a structural defect in the sentencing process. Id. The 
Faulks court observed that the requirement that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Moreover, without some showing that his attorney actually failed to 
discuss the PSR with Stevens, we will not presume that counsel acted 
negligently or otherwise provided ineffective assistance. See Strickland 
v. 
Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984) ("[A] court must indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance."). 
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defendant be present at both sentencing and resentencing 
was "the embodiment of a value deeply embedded in our 
polity (and our jurisprudence)." Id. at 209. While no one 
disputes the importance of the defendant's understanding 
the PSR, which is "the critical document not only in the 
sentencing process, but also in the deliberations of the 
Parole Commission and the Bureau of Prisons," Mays, 798 
F.2d at 80, Rule 32(c)(3)(A)'s verification requirement does 
not exhibit an even remotely similar "deeply rooted" 
genealogy. 
 
In Beckett, this Court held that the district court's failure 
to provide Beckett his right to allocution on resentencing 
did not require vacatur and resentencing because the 
district court had departed downward and sentenced 
Beckett below the applicable guidelines range and Beckett 
had demonstrated no prejudice. See Beckett, 208 F.3d at 
148 (citing United States v. Lewis, 10 F.3d 1086, 1092 (4th 
Cir. 1993)). Discussing the allocution right, the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Green, 81 S.Ct. 653 (1961), held 
that an earlier version of Rule 32 required that the 
defendant himself, and not merely his attorney, have an 
opportunity to address the court before sentencing. See id. 
at 655. In doing so, the Court traced the roots of the 
common law allocution back to the seventeenth century 
and observed that the need for that right persisted despite 
the many intervening changes in criminal procedure since 
that time. See id. ("The most persuasive counsel may not be 
able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with 
halting eloquence, speak for himself."). Despite the 
importance of this right, the Supreme Court held soon after 
Green that denial of the allocution right was not cognizable 
on federal habeas corpus review because it "is not a 
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete 
miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with 
the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Hill v. United 
States, 82 S.Ct. 468, 471 (1962). 
 
By contrast, the requirement that the sentencing court 
verify that the defendant has read and discussed the PSR 
with counsel was a point of some controversy and little 
consensus until 1983, when the drafters of the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure added it to Rule 32. See FED. R. CRIM. 
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P. 32 advisory committee's notes (chronicling dispute over 
and eventual adoption of this requirement). We find it 
significant that a defendant's right to allocution, 
indisputably more valued and "deeply rooted" than the 
verification requirement of Rule 32, nonetheless remains 
subject to harmless error analysis and fails to rise to the 
level of a structural defect. In light of that fact, as well as 
the general presumption against expanding the list of 
structural defects, we are unable to conclude that the 
district court's error in this case constituted a structural 
defect. Accordingly, we join the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in holding that noncompliance 
with Rule 32(c)(3)(A) does not require vacatur and 
resentencing without at least some showing of prejudice by 
the defendant. See Lockhart, 58 F.3d at 89; Stevens, 851 
F.2d at 144 & n.7; Rodriguez-Luna, 937 F.2d at 1213; 
Davila-Escovedo, 46 F.3d at 844; Rangel-Arreola, 991 F.2d 
at 1526 & n.5. 
 
As the Mays Court noted, district court errors like this 
one are regrettable and easily avoidable, and we exhort 
district courts to engage in the "simple practice" of 
addressing defendants directly to ensure they have read 
and discussed the PSR with counsel. See Mays, 798 F.2d at 
80. Nevertheless, we cannot agree that this type of error 
constitutes a structural defect in the sentencing process. In 
the absence of any showing of prejudice or the denial of 
substantial rights caused by this error, Stevens's claim 
must fail. 
 
II. Refusal to Depart Downward 
 
In his second point on appeal, Stevens argues that the 
district court erred in denying his request for a downward 
departure. At his sentencing hearing, Stevens moved for a 
downward departure on three separate grounds: (1) 
Stevens's criminal history category of VI significantly 
overrepresented the severity of his criminal history; (2) 
Stevens's post-offense rehabilitation, including the 
completion of religious and relationship-oriented courses, 
warranted downward departure; and (3) that a 
"combination of factors," including the fact that Stevens 
spent a significant amount of time in county jail facilities in 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania while awaiting his sentencing 
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hearing, warranted a downward departure.7  Regarding the 
third basis for departure, Stevens contended that the length 
of his incarceration in these county jails and the allegedly 
substandard conditions there were "mitigating 
circumstances" not taken into consideration by the United 
States Sentencing Commission that militated in favor of 
departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0.8 At the sentencing 
hearing, the court made the following remarks: 
 
       "Before I talk to Mr. Stevens, I think that having 
       reviewed the presentence investigation and having had 
       the benefit of defense counsel's memorandum with 
       regard to the guideline--criminal history category, I 
       think that on balance it probably does not over- 
       emphasize his criminal record. And, these retail thefts 
       were within a short span of time. There were a number 
       of them, three of them, in fact. And, I think the range 
       here of criminal six is appropriate based upon the 
       presentence investigation and his prior record, so I 
       won't change that. 
 
       With regard to any other downward departures, the 
       Court finds that there isn't a significant enough-- 
       although the Court feels it has the authority to grant a 
       departure here, the Bible studies and other studies the 
       defendant has engaged in are admirable, and studies I 
       think someone facing what he is facing would in fact 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Evidently, Stevens had been shuttled between various county jails 
while awaiting sentencing. He spent 35 days in Mercer County, New 
Jersey, 75 days in Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, and 132 days in 
Passaic County, New Jersey. 
 
8. U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 provides in relevant part: 
 
"[T]he sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range 
established by the applicable guidelines, if the court finds that there 
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a 
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that described.' . . . The decision as to whether 
and to what extent departure is warranted rests with the sentencing 
court on a case-specific basis . . . . Presence of any such factor may 
warrant departure from the guidelines, under some circumstances, in 
the discretion of the sentencing court." 
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       do and participate in. As to the incarceration factor, 
       which Counsel brought up, while the Court recognizes 
       that conditions in county prisons might not be as 
       conducive to and indeed aren't as conducive to getting 
       certain kinds of programs to him, I don't think what 
       has been represented to the Court here is the type of 
       incarceration that would warrant any consideration on 
       the guidelines for departure." 
 
Stevens concedes, as he must, that in denying the motion 
on the first two grounds, the district court clearly stated 
that it had the authority to grant a departure on these 
grounds but chose not to do so. He maintains, however, 
that in considering the third basis for departing, the 
"combination of factors" regarding his presentence 
incarceration, the district court did not make clear whether 
it was denying the departure on legal or discretionary 
grounds. 
 
This Court's jurisdiction to consider Stevens's argument 
depends on the basis for the district court's ruling. See 
United States v. Denardi, 891 F.2d 269, 271-72 (3d Cir. 
1989). If the ruling was based on the district court's belief 
that a departure on the grounds proffered by the defendant 
was legally impermissible, we have jurisdiction to determine 
whether the district court's understanding of the law was 
correct. See United States v. Mummert, 34 F.3d 201, 205 
(3d Cir. 1994). "By contrast, if the district court's ruling 
was based on an exercise of discretion, we lack 
jurisdiction." Id. If the district court's stated reasons are 
ambiguous--so that the record does not reflect whether the 
court's denial is based on legal or discretionary grounds-- 
then the proper remedy is to "vacate the sentence and 
remand for the district court to clarify the basis for its 
ruling." Id.; see also United States v. Evans, 49 F.3d 109, 
112 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
We find that the district court's comments were not 
sufficiently ambiguous as to require vacatur and remand. 
At the outset of the second paragraph, the court set out to 
discuss "any other downward departures." It then 
acknowledged that it had the authority to grant a departure 
on the basis of these factors, which were post-offense 
rehabilitation and "the incarceration factor." Regarding 
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Stevens's post-offense rehabilitation activities, such as his 
Bible study classes, the district court found them 
admirable but not sufficient to warrant a downward 
departure. This was clearly a discretionary decision. 
Assuming arguendo that the condition of Stevens's pretrial 
confinement is a permissible basis for downward departure,9 
it is similarly clear that the district court's denial of 
Stevens's request on this basis was also discretionary. 
When the district court stated "although the Court feels it 
has the authority to grant a departure here" we think it was 
referring to all of the "other downward departures" sought 
by Stevens, and not just the one referable to the Bible 
studies, which is the next item that the Court took up. 
Under these circumstances, when the district court stated 
that "I don't think what has been represented to the court 
here is the type of incarceration that would warrant any 
consideration on the guidelines for departure," the Court 
was not stating that it had no legal authority to grant a 
departure based on the conditions of Stevens's pretrial 
confinement, but rather that Stevens had not persuaded 
the court that a departure was appropriate in his case. This 
was an exercise of discretion and therefore unreviewable. 
See Mummert, 34 F.3d at 205. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. While there has been some contention among the district courts of 
this Circuit over the propriety and wisdom of considering the conditions 
of confinement as a basis for downward departures, several decisions 
indicate that granting a departure on this ground"is not categorically 
foreclosed." United States v. Ogembe, 41 F. Supp.2d 567, 571 (E.D. Pa. 
1999); see also United States v. Pacheco, 67 F. Supp.2d 495, 498 (E.D. 
Pa. 1999) ("While exceptionally hard conditions of confinement might 
qualify for a departure . . . , a defendant must demonstrate to the court 
that the conditions compare unfavorably to those suffered by other 
inmates.") (internal citations omitted); United States v. Miranda, 979 F. 
Supp. 1040, 1044-45 (D.N.J. 1997), appeal dismissed, 159 F.3d 1354 
(3d Cir. 1998) (denying downward departure based on conditions of 
pretrial confinement as record was "too sparse" to demonstrate that the 
conditions were "sufficiently deplorable" ); United States v. Sutton, 973 
F. 
Supp. 488, 493 (D.N.J. 1997), aff 'd, 156 F.3d 1226 (3d Cir. 1998) 
("Unusual pretrial confinement . . . in either length or severity of 
condition, can properly be considered by the sentencing court.") We do 
not decide the question of whether confinement conditions constitute a 
permissible basis for downward departure. 
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III. Sentence Calculation 
 
In a separate pro se brief, Stevens claims that when 
calculating his sentence for the February 11, 1997 
carjacking offense, the district court improperly imposed a 
five-level enhancement based on the offense characteristic 
of "brandishing" a firearm, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
S 2B3.1(b)(2)(C). While this enhancement would normally 
have applied to this carjacking offense, because Stevens 
also received a mandatory minimum ten-year concurrent 
sentence for carrying a firearm, under 18 U.S.C.S 924(c), 
the enhancement did not apply to the February 11 
carjacking. See U.S.S.G. S 2K2.4, App. Note 2.10 However, 
as reflected by the PSR, Stevens's sentence fully complied 
with the guidelines: pursuant to section 2K2.4, the 
"brandishing" enhancement was specifically not applied to 
Stevens's sentence for the February 11, 1997 offense.11 The 
enhancement was applied, however, to Stevens's sentence 
for his February 6, 1997 carjacking offense, respecting 
which he was not charged with a firearms violation. 
Applying the five-level enhancement to his sentence for the 
February 6, 1997 carjacking was entirely proper. 12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. U.S.S.G. S 2K2.4, Application Note 2, provides in relevant part: 
 
        "Where a sentence under this section is imposed in conjunction 
       with a sentence for an underlying offense, any specific 
characteristic 
       for the possession, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm . 
. . 
       is not to be applied in respect to the guideline for the underlying 
       offense." 
 
The Background Note states: 
 
        "18 U.S.C. SS 844(h), 924(c), and 929(a) provide mandatory 
       minimum penalties for the conduct proscribed. To avoid double 
       counting, when a sentence under this section is imposed in 
       conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, any specific 
       offense characteristic for explosive or firearm discharge, use, or 
       possession is not applied in respect to such underlying offense." 
11. Regarding the February 11, 1997 offense, Stevens did receive a four- 
level enhancement for abducting his victims, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
S 2B3.1(b)(4), and a two-level enhancement for committing an offense 
that involved carjacking, pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(5). 
 
12. Regarding the February 6, 1997 offense, Stevens received the two- 
level carjacking enhancement, as well as a one-level enhancement for 
committing an offense that involved a loss (actual or intended) of more 
than $10,000, pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2B3.1(b)(7). 
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Conclusion 
 
Stevens's sentences are 
 
AFFIRMED. 
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